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NOTES
Constitutional Law--State v. Felmet: The Extent of Free
Speech Rights on Private Property Under the North
Carolina Constitution
Early in 1981 the Supreme Court of North Carolina took a blind step
down a relatively uncharted path.1 In State v. Fe/met2 the supreme court held
that the free speech provisions of the United States and North Carolina Con-
stitutions do not protect an individual from prosecution for trespassing when
he solicits signatures for a petition in the parking lot of a privately owned
shopping mall.3
On June 4, 1979, Joe Andrew Felmet was arrested for trespassing4 while
gathering signatures in the parking lot of Hanes Mall, a privately owned, re-
gional shopping center located in Winston-Salem. 5 The mall "had a policy of
prohibiting ... solicitation" without prior written permission. 6 After being
informed of defendant's activities, the mall security director, aware that de-
fendant had not obtained prior permission, asked him to stop soliciting. As-
serting a constitutional right to free speech, defendant refused to leave. The
police eventually were summoned and, after some discussion, defendant was
arrested.
The issue of free speech rights on private property first surfaced in the
1. The North Carolina Supreme Court had never before addressed the issue of free speech
protection on private property. The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue on
several occasions. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (states may
interpret free speech provisions of state constitutions to protect free speech on private property);
Hudens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (first amendment does not protect picketing on privately
pwnea snopping center parking lot); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (first amendment
does not protect handbilling in courtyard of privately owned shopping mall); Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (first amendment protects
picketing in privately owned shopping center parking lot when picketing is reasonably related to
shopping center activities). See also People v. Sterling, 52 IMI 2d 287, 287 N.E.2d 711 (1972)
(following L/oyd Corp.); State v. Rose, 44 Ohio Misc. 17, 335 N.E.2d 758 (1975) (following Lloyd
Corp. and Logan Valley exception); Lenrich Assocs. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972)
(following~loyd Corp.); Homart Dev. Co. v. Fein, 110 RI. 1372,293 A.2d 493 (1972) (dictum that
court would thereafter follow Lloyd Corp.); Rains v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 599 S.W.2d 121 (rex.
Civ. App. 1980) (following Lloyd Corp.).
2. 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981) (6-0 decision; Meyers J., not participating).
3. Id. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712.
4. "If any person after being forbidden to do so, shall go or enter upon the lands of another,
without a license therefor he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (Cum.
Supp. 1979).
5. 302 N.C. at 177, 273 S.E.2d at 711.
6. Id. Signs at three entrances to the facility read as follows:
Notice to the people. The property comprising Hanes Mall is private property. Solicita-
tions or distribution of handbills is absolutely prohibited on this property. Written per-
mission must be obtained from the Manager's Office to use this property in any activity
other than shopping.
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1946 case of Marsh v. Alabama.7 A Jehovah's Witness was convicted of tres-
passing when she failed to leave private property after being asked to do so.
The private property was a company town which, except for title,
ha[d] all the characteristics of any other American town. The prop-
erty consist[ed] of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which businesses
were situated. . . .In short the town and its shopping district [were]
accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there [was]
nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping
center except the fact that title to the property belong[ed] to a private
corporation.8
In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme Court stated that
title to the property did not resolve the issue.9 "Ownership," the Court said,
"does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his ad-
vantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do
his rights become circumscribed by the... constitutional rights of those who
use it."' 0 The Court thus invoked a balancing test and, with specific recogni-
tion of the preferred position that individual liberties hold in our society,"
struck the balance in favor of free speech.
Over twenty years elapsed 12 before the Supreme Court, in Amalgamated
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 13 had occasion to re-
examine Marsh. Logan Valley Plaza owned a large, newly developed shop-
ping center near Altoona, Pennsylvania. The controversy arose when a super-
market located in the center opened, employing a wholly nonunion staff.
Within ten days after opening, union members began picketing the store.
Most of the picketing took place in the parcel pickup area and the immediately
7. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
8. Id. at 502-03.
9. Id. at 505.
10. Id. at 506.
11. Id. at 509.
12. It appears that many of the lower court cases decided in the twenty years between Marsh
and Logan Valley arose in the picketing context. People v. Barisi, 23 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2190(N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1948), for example, involved the picketing of a newsstand located inside Penn
Station. The court recognized that private property was involved but questioned whether it was a
private place. Dismissing the complaint, the court relied squarely on Marsh, stating that "by
opening up their property to the general public, the owners of the station have made it a quasi-
public place, and as such their ownership is 'circumscribed by the constitutional rights of those
who use it."' Id. at 2191.
The issue also arose, eleven years later, in State v. Williams, 44 L.R.ILM. (BNA) 2357 (Balti-
more, Md. Crim. Ct. 1959). W'lllamr involved picketing in a privately owned shopping center.
Citing Marsh, the court stated that "the property involved is not 'private' any more. That is why
the competing interest of freedom of speech must be served." Id. at 2362. Other courts have
expressed approval of, or reached the same result. See, eg., Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200
F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952) (solicitation protected on company-owned walkway); Schwartz-Torrance
Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 233, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1964) (picketing protected in shopping center parking lot);
Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962)
(dictum). But see People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961) (unlawful to distribute
union literature in Sears parking lot).
13. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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adjoining parking lot. The picketing was at all times peaceful, lacking both
violence and threats of violence, although there was sporadic congestion at the
parcel pickup area. Nevertheless, the owner of the shopping complex was able
to obtain an injunction prohibiting the picketing.
The issue, as the Court saw it, was "whether peaceful picketing of a busi-
ness... located within a shopping center [could] be enjoined on the ground
that it constitutes an unconsented invasion of the property rights of the owners
of the land on which the center is situated."' 4 Relying heavily on Marsh, the
Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision uphold-
ing the injunction against picketing.15 Speaking for the Court, Justice Mar-
shall focused on the "similarities between the business block in Marsh and the
shopping center" 16 in Logan Valley, noting that the only difference between
the two cases was that Logan Valley Plaza lacked title to the surrounding
property. Believing this difference to be of no constitutional significance, the
Court held "that because the shopping center serves as a community business
block 'and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those
passing through,'" the public may exercise their first amendment rights on the
private property "in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put.' 17
Just four years after Logan Valley, the Court was confronted with the
issue1s reserved in that case of "the right of a privately owned shopping center
to prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling is
unrelated to the shopping center's operations."'19 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner20 a
case whose facts are very similar to the facts in Felmet, the defendants were
inside Lloyd Center, a large, retail shopping center in Portland, Oregon, dis-
tributing handbills in opposition to the draft and the war in Vietnam. The
center was open to the public, with a considerable effort being made to attract
shoppers and to create customer goodwill in the community. Threatened with
an arrest for trespassing, defendants left the mall and subsequently obtained a
permanent injunction preventing the Lloyd Corporation from interfering with
their first amendments rights.
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that a privately owned and oper-
ated shopping center is not required to be open to the public, and therefore
14. Id. at 309. In what later turned out to be a key clarification of the issue, the Court added
that it did not "consider whether respondents' property rights could, consistently with the First
Amendment, justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose to the use
to which the shopping center was being put." Id. at 320 n.9. Although the question was expressly
reserved by the Court, lower courts presumed such first amendment activity could not be enjoined.
See, ag., Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); Blue Ridge Shopping Center,
Inc. v. Schleiminger, 423 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
15. 391 U.S. at 325.
16. Id. at 317 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 508).
17. Id. at 319-20. Justice Marshall also noted that restricting picketing to the streets and
sidewalks not only dilutes the effect of the message but also exposes the picketers or distributers to
increased and unwarranted hazards. Id. at 322.
18. See supra note 14.
19. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
20. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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members of the public are not free to exercise their first amendment rights at
the shopping center.21 Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
closely examined both Marsh and Logan Valley before deciding neither was
applicable. The Court believed that in Logan Valley it was constitutionally
significant that the picketing was directed at a store within the mall.22 Marsh
also was distinguished because it involved a company town, "an economic
anomaly of the past."'23 Relying heavily on Justice Black's dissent in Logan
Valley,24 the Court limited Marsh to the company town situation.
Respondents argued that the shopping center had opened itself up for
public use generally: "property [does not] lose its private character merely
because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes." 25
The Supreme Court rejected this position,26 holding that in the absence of
state action, the first amendment rights of respondents must give way to the
property rights contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 27
In its most recent decision in this area, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins,28 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that a state may in-
terpret the free speech provision of its constitution to protect speech in a
privately owned shopping center without infringing on federally protected
property rights of the owner.29 Respondents in Pruneyard were distributing
handbills and soliciting signatures for petitions inside the central courtyard of
petitioner's mall. After they were asked to leave, respondents sought an in-
junction in the superior court preventing the center from interfering with their
petitioning. The injunction was denied and the California Court of Appeals
21. Id. at 570.
22. Id. at 560-61. The Court thus essentially limited Logan Valley to its facts.
23. Id. at 561.
24. The Court quoted extensively from Justice Black's dissent. See, e.g., 407 U.S. at 562-63.
"As Mr. Justice Black was the author of the Court's opinion in Marsh, his analysis of its rationale
is especially meaningful" Id. at 562 n.10.
25. Id. at 569.
26. Respondents' argument, even if meritorious, misapprehends the scope of the invita-
tion extended to the public. The invitation is to come to the center to do business with
the tenants. It is true that the facilities at the Center are used for certain meetings and
for various promotional activities .... [But] [t]here is no open-ended invitation to the
public to use the Center for any and all purposes, however incompatible with the inter-
ests of both the stores and the shoppers whom they serve.
Id. at 564-65.
27. Id. at 570. In an anticlimatic decision, Logan Valley was specifically overruled in Hudg-
ens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Hudgens involved peaceful picketing within a privately owned
shopping center. The striking picketers were warehouse employees of one of the retail stores
located in the shopping center. After threats of arrests for trespassing by the shopping center
management stopped the picketing, a charge of unfair labor practices was filed with the National
Labor Relations Board. Relying on Lloyd Corp., the NLRB upheld the right to picket; the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974). Reversing the NLRB and court
of appeals, the Supreme Court reviewed the cases culminating in Lloyd Corp. and concluded that
"ifit was not clear before, .. the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision
in the Lloyd case .... The ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the
holding in Logan Valley." 424 U.S. at 518. "[U]nder the present state of the law the constitutional
guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case [involving picketing on private prop-
erty]." Id. at 521.
28. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
29. Id. at 88.
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affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, invoking a provision of the
California Constitution that protects "speech and petitioning, reasonably exer-
cised in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned."'30
After holding that Lloyd Corp. did not create a federally protected prop-
erty right,31 the Supreme Court considered whether the decision of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court amounted to a taking without just compensation under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The
Court recognized that the right to exclude others is "one of the essential sticks
in the bundle of property rights" 32 but added that not every government intru-
sion is a taking.33 The Court then held that the protection of free speech on
private property under the state constitution amounted to neither a taking nor
a denial of due process. 34
Throughout this period of Supreme Court decisions, the degree of protec-
tion to be afforded free speech on private property remained an unanswered
question in North Carolina. Defendant's argument in Felmet thus presented
the North Carolina Supreme Court its first opportunity to examine closely the
free speech provision of the North Carolina Constitution.35
To persuade the court not to interpret the North Carolina constitution
parallel with the federal Constitution, and thereby to avoid application of
Lloyd Corp., defendant offered a two-step argument.36 First, defendant com-
pared differences in the wording of the North Carolina Constitution37 and the
30. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 80-81.
32. Id. at 82.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 83. The Court also considered whether the mall owners' first amendment rights
were violated by the State's forcing them to adopt the speech of others, under Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977). The Maynard Court held that a state may not "require an individual to
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his property [the
state motto on a license plate] in a manner and for the expresspurpose that it be observed and
read by the public." Id. at 713. The Pruneyard Court answered in the negative, noting that the
state was not forcing the appellant to adopt any particular message. Moreover, the owner of the
shopping center had elected to open his property for other than strictly private use. 447 U.S. at 87.
This statement arguably resurrects the Logan Valley-Marsh rationale that the more an owner
opens his private property to the public, the more his property rights become circumscribed by the
constitutional rights of the public. See Comment, Pruneyard Shopping Center . Robins, 9 HoF-
STRA L. Rnv. 289, 312 (1980).
35. The free speech provision was added to the North Carolina Constitution in 1970. See
infra note 61.
In addition to his arguments based on the state constitution, defendant contended that his
soliciting was protected under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. The court,
relying on Lloyd Corp., rejected the latter contention. Although the soliciting in Lloyd Corp.
occurred inside the mall, the Hudgens decision made it clear that the Lloyd Corp. rationale applies
to speech anywhere on private property. See supra note 27. Because of the correctness of this
aspect of the Felmet decision, this subsection will focus only on defendant's argument under the
North Carolina Constitution.
36. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 7-16, State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708
(1981).
37. The North Carolina Constitution provides that "[fireedom of speech and of the press are
two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person
should be responsible for their abuse." N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 14.
19821
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Constitution of the United States.38 Since identical words in the state and
federal constitutions may be subject to different interpretations, 39 obvious dif-
ferences in wording should be no less subject to different interpretations.
Defendant then argued that the state constitution should be interpreted to
protect speech unprotected by the federal constitution.40 Specifically, defend-
ant argued that the court should mirror the interpretation given to similar lan-
guage in the California constitution 4' by the California Supreme Court.42
Relying on its pre-Lloyd Corp. decisions, many of which interpreted the
United States Constitution, the California court had held that orderly handbil-
ling and soliciting the courtyard of a privately owned shopping mall was pro-
tected speech under the state constitution.4 3
The supreme court's curt response to defendant's contention included lit-
tle constitutional analysis. The court's entire discussion consisted of the fol-
lowing paragraph*
Nor were defendant's actions protected under Article I, section
14 of the North Carolina Constitution which reads:
Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great
balwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but
everyperson should be held responsible for their abuse.
. ..This Court could, under the Supremacy Clause, interpret our
State Constitution to protect conduct similar to that of defendant
without infringing on any federally protected property right of the
owners of private shopping centers. Pruneyard Shopping v. Robins
.... However, we are not so disposed. Defendant's conviction for
trespass is free from prejudicial error. The judgment must therefore
be upheld.44
The lack of constitutional analysis is a major flaw in the opinion. Gener-
ally, a defendant should be informed of the reasons the court found persuasive
in reaching its result.45 A reasoned opinion ensures fairness by showing the
38. The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
39. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206
S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974).
40. 302 N.C. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712.
41. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech
or press." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2. For the corresponding North Carolina provision, see supra
note 50.
42. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 909-12, 592 P.2d 341, 346-48, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-61 (1979), aj7'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
43. Id. at 911, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The California Supreme Court also
rested its decision on the "'right to... petition government for redress of grievances .... ' (Art.
I, § 3)" under the California Constitution. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
Although not raised by the defendant in Femet, this argument was presumably available because
the North Carolina Constitution contains a similar provision: "The people have a right to assem-
ble together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the
General Assembly for redress or grievances ... " N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12.
44. 302 N.C. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
45. See, eg., NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 970 (5th
Cir. 1970); Phelps Dodge Corp., Morenci Branch v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 379, 381, 368
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losing party that his case has been treated carefully 46 and that the adjudicating
body "has considered the issues . . . in light of relevant statutory and case
law."47 The interests of justice are better served by an opinion that explains
the reasons underlying the decision.48
Moreover, a detailed decision provides a check on the judge himself.49 A
decision-maker might well change his mind when he sits down and attempts to
justify a decision.50 Thus, a well-written opinion not only forces the decision-
maker to examine closely his reasoning, but it opens that reasoning up to in-
dependent judicial scrutiny.51 A final but not unimportant benefit of a well-
reasoned opinion is the guidance it provides both the bar and bench.52
In addition to these policy considerations, the facts of this particular ap-
peal underscore the need for a better reasoned opinion. Defendant was con-
victed of trespass in the superior court.53 He appealed the decision to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal "for failure...
to show jurisdiction" of the trial court in the record on appeal.54 Defendant
then petitioned for and was granted55 a writ of certiorari to the supreme court
for review of the dismissal.
The supreme court was unwilling to conclude that the court of appeals
P.2d 450, 452 (1962); Hoult v. Kuhne-Simmons Co., 64 111. App. 3d 476, 477-78, 381 N.E.2d 403,
404 (1978). See also K. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 289-90 (1960).
46. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 289.
47. Sarty v. Forney, 12 Or. App. 251, 253, 506 P.2d 535, 536 (1973).
48. See United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C.), a 'd, 479 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1973); People v. Dupie, 395 Mich. 483, 487 n.2, 286 N.W.2d 494, 496 n.2 (1975). See also P.
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
CARRINGTON & MEADOR].
49. "[A]n articulated discussion ... reduces, if not eliminates, the easy temptation or ten-
dency to ill-considered or even arbitrary action by those having the awesome power of almost
final review." NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.
1970); see also R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 160 (1961).
50. See Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions From Below the Bench, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 831,
838 (1961); White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 598 VA. L. REv. 279, 288 (1973).
51. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 49, at 159. See also, Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412
U.S. 427 (1973); Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972); Cleveland, Cin., Chi. & St. L.
Ry. v. United States, 275 U.S. 404, 414-15 (1928); City of Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275
U.S. 164 (1927); Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 675 (1926).
52. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.
1970); see also K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 288. The Felmet decision is subject to different
interpretations that could lead to different consequences, thereby confusing rather than educating
the legal community.
53. Record at 1, State v. Felmet, 802 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
54. 302 N.C. at 174, 273 S.E.2d at 710. Jurisdiction of the superior court in this case was
derivative and arose only upon a conviction in the district court. Id. at 174-75, 273 S.E.2d at 710.
"When the record is silent and the appellate court is unable to determine whether the court below
had jurisdiction, the appeal should be dismissed.' Id. at 176, 273 S.E.2d at 711.
Defendant was not aware of this jurisdictional error until oral arguments in the court of
appeals. Rather than argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction, which if successful would
have arrested the judgment entered by the superior court, State v. Hardy, 298 N.C. 191, 257 S.E.2d
426 (1979), defendant "moved to amend the record to include the judgment of the district court
and appeal entries therefrom." 302 N.C. at 176, 273 S.E.2d at 711. It was the uncontested motion
which the court of appeals denied and from which the defendant appealed.
55. 301 N.C. 99, 273 S.E.2d 303, 303-04 (1980).
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had abused its discretion. 56 Rather than dismissing the appeal at this stage,
however, the court "decided to allow the amendment to reflect subject matter
jurisdiction and then pass upon the substantive issue of the appeal. 57 It is
unclear why the court went out of the way to hear the substantive issue if it did
not intend to give the issue its full attention.58 As a result, the court failed
defendant in terms of fairness, disillusioned him with the system, and wasted
valuable time and resources.59
The court's emphasis on the last clause of article I, section 14 of the North
Carolina Constitution makes it probable that the decision rested on a finding
that defendant had abused the right to free speech. But exactly where the
abuse lies in the present case remains a mystery. One interpretation of the
opinion is that the abuse in question is the manner of defendant's conduct
rather than his mere presence soliciting signatures on the private property.
Support for this interpretation is found in the court's statement that "[t]he ac-
costing of customers in the private parking lot of Hanes Mall. . . [was not]
protected under Article I, section 14 of the North Carolina Constitution
. "... 60 If the abuse in fact lay in defendant's accosting behavior, then the
orderly solicitation of signatures for a petition on private property may still be
protected under the North Carolina Constitution.
There is, however, a different interpretation that would not protect the
defendant's conduct even if orderly. The court might have been equating
abuse of the right with mere presence on private property without the consent
or against the wishes of the owner. Under this view, private property rights
outweigh protection of free and orderly speech in the court's determination of
when conduct constitutes an abuse of the right to free speech. The court may
have interpreted the State Constitution in accord with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the United States Constitution, 61 foreclosing all rights to free
56. 302 N.C. at 176, 273 S.E.2d at 711.
57. Id
58. The supreme court may have wanted to place its imprimatur on the superior court con-
viction, thereby delineating the extent of free speech protection in North Carolina. If this is the
case, the court fell short of its goal.
59. If... judges do not perform by a process which is visibly rational, they may as well
abandon the enterprise and leave the litigants as they are found after trial courts...
have made their decisions. The burden and expense of the appeal are not justified if
these imperatives are not observed.
CARRINGTON & MEADOR, supra note 48, at 11.
60. Id. at 178, 273 S.E.2d at 712 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 44.
61. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
Although interpreting the constitutions similarly may be the proper course to pursue, it leaves an
important question unanswered. In 1970 the North Carolina General Assembly and populace
amended the State Constitution to give Article I, section 14 its present form. Prior to 1970, the
constitution did not contain an express free speech provision. INSTITUTE OF Gov'T, U.N.C.
CrAPEL HILL, COSTrrUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA 1971 8 (1970). Assuming that the drafters of
amended section 14 intended it to be interpreted along the same lines as the first amendment
speech provision, then the drafters arguably meant to protect free speech on private shopping
centers, because Logan Valley was the controlling precedent at that time. When the State Consti-
tution was amended, there was no reason to believe that it would not protect a defendant in the
Felmet situation.
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speech on private property, absent consent of the owners.62 Support for this
interpretation may be found in the court's observation that it could, consistent
with the United States Constitution, "interpret [the] State Constitution to pro-
tect conduct similar to that of the defendant," coupled with its refusal to do
so.63
If this second interpretation will be followed in the future,64 the court's
failure to "recognize the modem context in which [free speech] rights are to be
exercised165 will limit severely the number of forums available for the free
exchange of ideas.66 "Inexpensive and easily utilized channels of public com-
munication are crucial to an effective system of freedom of expression." 67
Shopping centers and malls have replaced downtown commercial districts as
the places where members of the public come not only to shop, but to "stroll,
sit, meet friends, and participate in community activities as they once did in
downtown business districts."'68
The court has left few inexpensive and easily accessible channels of com-
munication open to the general public. 6 9 It appears that the court is refusing
to take account of the changing American lifestyles in the 1980s. If title is the
key to forums of free speech, privately held property-such as apartment com-
plexes, mobile home parks, condominiums-and planned communities-such
as labor camps7° and retirement communities or nursing homes7 1-are inac-
62. This interpretation is most likely the correct one. Thus, in not protecting "conduct simi-
lar to that of defendant," the court must have meant to prevent all speech on private property
without the owner's consent and not only the accosting behavior of the defendant. 302 N.C. at
178, 273 S.E.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
63. Id. For the court's evaluation of defendant's free speech claim under the North Carolina
constitution see supra text accompanying note 44.
64. See supra note 62.
65. Comment, The Exercise of First Amendment Rights in Prvately Owned Shopping Centers,
1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 427, 434 (1973), criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. The
same attack on Lloyd Corp. was made in Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan
Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1217 (1973) ("[Lloyd Corp.] indicates an
unwillingness on the part of the Court to deal with some new and basic changes in American
economic life caused by the modem mall shopping center.").
66. See generally Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE
LJ. 165 (1980).
67. Id. at 165. See United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
(state must tolerate inconvenience of handbilling in public parking lot).
68. Note, supra note 66, at 168.
69. It is no answer to say that radios in automobiles and television and newspapers in
homes carry enough ideas and opinions to the public. Free speech is not the exclusive
province of those with money enough to buy time or space in the news media. Without
opportunities for effective handbilling and other direct, inexpensive contracts [sic] with
the public, the less powerful will be poorly heard however worthy their speech.
United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
As an examination of the facts in Felmet illustrates, access to the public streets and sidewalks
in front of the mall is wholly inadequate. Defendant was seeking signers for his petition. He
could not solicit signatures for a petition in the fleeting moment when a car was stopped at the
mall entrance. Moreover, the risk imposed on an individual as he runs from the comer to an
automobile and back, combined with the danger to those drivers whose attention the individual is
trying to attract, counsels against recommending this as an adequate alternative. See Amalga-
mated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 322 (1968).
70. See Note, Access to Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v. Alabama Revisited, 55 CsI.-KENT
L. R v. 285 (1979).
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cessible under the rule laid down in Felmet.72
In State v. Felmet the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with an
ideal opportunity to balance free speech interests against the interests of pri-
vate property owners.73 Unfortunately, the supreme court failed to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity to harmonize two great bulwarks of our
democratic system. Let us hope that the path the court chooses in the future is
better reasoned and more enlightening.
JONATHAN A. BERKELHAMMER
71. See Comment, Nursing Home Access: Making the Patient.Bll ofRights Work, 54 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 473 (1977).
72. Note, supra note 80, at 169-70. The forum that the court may be foreclosing is not insub-
stantial. Rental units account for over 35% of total occupied housing units in America. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1980, at 793 (1980) (Table No. 1408). In addition, "[o]ver four million Americans already live in
some form of condominium unit" with estimates that half the population will live in condomini-
ums within twenty years. Note, supra note 66, at 170 n.26. As of 1974 it was estimated that there
were in excess of one million residents living in the "over 16,500 nursing home facilities eligible
for federal Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement ...." Id. at 170 n.29.
Mr. Justice Brennan, recognizing the trend of restricting individual liberties, has urged states
to construe their constitutions broadly to minimize the restriction of liberties. See Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual R'ghts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). The contrac-
tion of public forums is a prime example of Mr. Justice Brennan's concern. With five United
States Supreme Court justices over the age of seventy-Chief Justice Burger, 74; Justices Brennan,
75; Marshall, 73; Blackman, 73; and Powell, 74--and a conservative President in office, there is no
reason to expect this trend to abate. The need for states to examine their constitutions carefully
and generously thus becomes even more important. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (applauding the California Supreme Court).
73. The Court had the unique opportunity to be innovative yet compromising. It could have
protected free speech in the parking lot while at the same time holding that the interests of private
property owners would prevail inside the mall. Cf. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23
Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), a7'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (handbilling and
soliciting under state constitution inside mall courtyard). The New Jersey Supreme Court has
subsequently followed the California court's holding. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 425 A.2d 615
(1980) (interpreting a constitutional provision virtually identical to the California and the North
Carolina provisions, the court ruling that free speech is protected on privately owned Princeton
University property). Sut see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (first amendment does not
protect picketing in shopping center parking lot).
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